Ontology, or the Theory of Being — Background and Themes

The Preface as a Roadmap

The preface is essential for understanding Coffey's project. He states that many non-scholastic writers regard Scholastic theories as merely historical, but he argues that the issues are still debated in altered settings and new terminology. He lists specific medieval discussions—Potentia and Actus, Essence and Existence, Individuation, Substance and Accident—and promises to show their relevance. This framing alerts the reader that the book is not a dry historical survey but an attempt to demonstrate the living significance of Scholastic ontology. The preface also notes that the volume is part of a trilogy, with a companion volume on the Theory of Knowledge forthcoming, and that the present work assumes the epistemological position of Moderate Realism. A first-time reader should pay close attention to this preface to grasp the author's aims and limitations.

The Middle Excerpts: Substance and Incomplete Substances

In the later chapter on Substance and Accident, Coffey introduces the concept of an incomplete substance—a substantial principle that does not exist independently but forms a complete composite substance with another. He uses the example of the human soul united with a material principle. The reasoning is precise: an incomplete substance verifies the definition of substance as a mode of being that naturally exists in itself, yet it does not exist as an individual of a species. Coffey distinguishes this from an accident, which inheres in a substance. He argues that if accidents can be real, then incomplete substances, being a higher grade of reality, must also be real. This passage illustrates Coffey's method of building from accepted Scholastic theses (e.g., the spirituality of the soul) to defend a metaphysical concept. The reader should note how Coffey uses the principle of non-contradiction and hierarchical reasoning to establish the intelligibility of his terms.

The Later Excerpts: Nature and Finality

Later in the same chapter, Coffey discusses the terms essence, substance, and nature, noting that they denote the same thing under different aspects. He defines nature as the essence regarded as the fundamental principle of a being's activities. Every finite individual, he writes, comes into existence incomplete, with essential perfections actual but intermediate and final perfections only potential. These are realized through connatural activities. Coffey then invokes St. Thomas's dictum that every being is intended for activity, and he ties this to the concept of universal order: by the interplay of activities, beings realize and sustain the cosmos. This passage reveals Coffey's teleological framework and his integration of metaphysical principles with a broader vision of order. A first-time reader should observe how Coffey moves from definitions to a systematic account of purpose and activity, grounding ontology in a dynamic view of reality.

Coffey's Scholastic Vocabulary and Its Challenges

Throughout the excerpts, Coffey employs a specialized Scholastic vocabulary that may be unfamiliar to modern readers. Terms like potentia, actus, reductivé, and connatural appear without extensive glossing. The preface acknowledges this by promising to transpose medieval questions into contemporary language, but the text itself retains many Latin phrases and technical distinctions. For example, the discussion of incomplete substances uses the phrase reductivé to describe how such a substance belongs to the category of substance only referentially. A first-time reader should be prepared to encounter such terms and may benefit from consulting a glossary of Scholastic philosophy. Coffey's style is clear but dense, with each paragraph building on previous distinctions. The reader should also note that Coffey assumes the truth of certain theses from psychology and cosmology, such as the spirituality of the soul, and does not argue for them within this volume.

Reading Coffey's Ontology requires patience with its systematic method and technical vocabulary. The preface provides the key to understanding his project: he is not merely summarizing medieval thought but reinterpreting it for a modern audience. The middle and later excerpts show how he applies this method to specific problems, such as the nature of substance and the role of finality. A first-time reader should focus on the logical structure of each argument and the way Coffey connects definitions to broader metaphysical claims. The book rewards careful study, offering a coherent Scholastic framework that remains in dialogue with contemporary philosophy.

I remember how Coffey’s Ontology spoke of potency and act as a quiet, unfinished conversation. That same unhurried patience lives in A New Philosophy — Background and Themes, another voice from that era, asking old questions without shouting them. They share a kind of dignified whisper, two strangers who nod to each other across the shelf.